The American Myth of Bailing Out Europe

  

 

On the Term, “Myth”

 

In this essay, I will be using the term “myth” in the technical sense of, “a meaning giving story,” and not in the sense of something that is not true.  Every country has its national myths that help to give a sense of identity and purpose.  Empires, especially, need grand myths to explain or justify their expansionist or imperial endeavours to their population and to their adversaries.  For the Spanish Empire, it was saving the souls of the peoples they conquered.  For the French and British Empires, it was “the white man’s burden” of “civilising savages.”  For the Soviet Union, it was liberating the peasants and workers of the world from the counter-revolutionary forces of capitalism and creating a global proletarian paradise.  For the United States of America, it was the “manifest destiny” given by God to be a light to the nations and to shield the new republics in the America’s from recolonisation by Europe (the Monroe Doctrine).

 

Some national myths are more specific to a moment, such as the Nazi story of a betrayal of the German cause in World War I by the internal forces of Socialism, Communism, and the Jews (which were all inseparably linked in the ideology expressed in Hitler’s “Mein Kampf”), who were sponsored by an international Jewish banking conspiracy.  The goal was the purification of the German “race” and to make Germany great once again.  It is interesting to contrast another fascist dictator, Francisco Franco.  He also claimed to be fighting international leftist forces, but instead of the pure race theory, his crusade was the preservation of the Catholic nature of Spanish society, and the crushing of the centrifugal forces of regionalism.

 

The common feature of all such national myths is that they begin with small kernels of fact which are usually simplified, pulled out of their historical context, and woven into an often largely fictional or “mythologised” framework.  Yes, Spain was the most successful “missionizer” of all the European powers, but it was not the promise of souls that pulled the conquistadors forward, but the lure of gold and silver.  Yes, Britain and France introduced those new, remarkable technologies of the industrial revolution to many parts of the world, and implemented the new style of bureaucratic organization that emerged in the nineteenth century, but again, it was not the improvement of the lives of the conquered that was the draw, but rather the riches and resources of the lands where those people happened to live.  Yes, the Soviet system sought to improve the lives of workers, but those who ran the system saw opportunities to extend imperial control over other nations via the vehicle of their ideology, which became apparent in the subjugation of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II.  Yes, it was the Social Democratic Party of Germany that had dissolved the monarchy and proclaimed a republic, but only after the last members of the imperial family rejected the responsibility of taking control of a failing war machine.  The rest of the Nazi story was a jumble of fabrications and bogeyman tales.  And yes, in Spain, Stalin’s quest for influence was real, and yes, the Basques were seeking autonomy, but the Republic only turned to Stalin out of desperation, and Basque aspirations had nothing to do with independence, only the desire to return to the royal privileges (fueros) they had enjoyed until the nineteenth century.

 

I will come back to the American grand myth below, but the narrative of “bailing out Europe” is one of those smaller meaning giving stories linked to specific circumstances.  In brief, it goes like this: “America is constantly having to save Europe from itself, and they have been freeloading off the US for decades now for their security.  It’s time they paid their own way.”

 

The kernel of truth is that the United States has played large roles in 1) bringing World War I to a speedier end, 2) bringing World War II to a speedier end, and 3) providing the military muscle to back up western Europe against Soviet encroachment.  The rest is oversimplification and ignores the US role in encouraging some of this dependence.  It also ignores how European powers have been key allies and enablers for US global domination.

 

 

The Roots of the Myth

 

Let’s begin with the lead up to the World Wars.  In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain and quickly defeated an old colonial empire which was on its last legs.  This propelled the United States into the club of global colonial powers.  While three conquests were within the zone of the Monroe Doctrine (Cuba, the eastern ¾ of Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico), and while in conformity with its self-image as a promotor of self-determination and democracy, the US granted independence to the first two, the other conquests projected the United States far into the Pacific: the Philippines, Guam, and western Samoa.  For context, Guam was surrounded by German controlled Micronesia, and the eastern half of Samoa was also a German possession.

 

United States business interests had long been trying to compete with the European powers (Britain, France, Germany, Russia—but also more recently the Asian outlier Japan) in getting concessions in China.  The new Pacific possessions, especially the Philippines, were seen as forward bases of operations for achieving this.  It was also at this time that the United States annexed the Republic of Hawai’i, which was run by a group of American businessmen who had staged a coup against the reigning Hawai’ian Queen Lili’uokalani in 1893 and relegated the native Hawai’ian population to vassals in their own land.

 

In 1899, the Boxer Rebellion broke out in China against the foreign powers who were exploiting the country and its people.  The United States sent the “China Relief Expedition”—navy ships and Marines—to assist its fellow colonial powers in subduing the nativist Chinese uprising.  This was the first time since the American Revolution that US forces had operated in concert with foreign powers.  Back then it was with France against British rule.  This time, it was with France, Britain, and the others against Chinese self-determination.

 

In 1904, in return for helping Panamanian separatists gain their independence from Colombia, the United States was granted the swath of land along which would be built the Panama Canal.  Completed in 1914, it gave the United States an edge in moving its naval vessels from ocean to ocean, as well as shortening the freighter routes between the US east and west coasts—all in a bid to match and exceed the European colonial powers.

 

Despite the isolationist rhetoric at home, by the time World War I broke out, the interests of the Unted States were enmeshed with those of other colonial powers in the global resources grab.  The United States did not sit at the sidelines of the Great War for three years because of benign disinterest.  Woodrow Wilson and his administration, who were idealists for democracy and self-determination, waited to see if the likely outcome of the war would mean anything for American interests, which meant primarily, business interests.  As well, the American electorate was divided on the conflict.  The pro-British east coast elite saw it quite differently from the large German and Austrian immigrant communities—the largest foreign-born population at the time.

 

The United States might have continued to sit on the sidelines, quietly sending assistance to Britain, had Germany not 1) directed its U-Boots to begin attacking American flagged vessels, and 2) proposed an alliance to Mexico in exchange for a restoration of lost Mexican territory (the “Zimmermann Telegram”).  Sentiments that had been partly turned against Germany by its invasion of Belgium and its use of the submarine “terror weapon” to sink civilian ships, such as happened in 1915 against the British flagged Lusitania, now boiled over in rage.  America had to go to war to defend its interests.  Though some might try to frame this moment as a philanthropic “baling out Europe”, it was, in fact, a decision out of self-interest, national security, and national pride.

 

The addition of fresh troops and logistics from the United States, combined with the deteriorating political and economic situation inside Germany, hastened the end of the most destructive conflict the world had known up to that point.  America came off as the (super-)hero who showed up at the last minute to save the day.  Though it’s role in bringing the war to an end should not be minimised, neither should it be exaggerated.  America’s brief participation granted it a seat at the negotiating table—indeed, the chief seat.  Not a bad political coup for an 18-month participation out of a 50-month long conflict.  Indeed, the US participation in the war was comparatively limited, fighting only on the western front and at sea against German U-Boots.  By contrast, Britain and France had effectively neutralized Germany’s overseas empire and fleet.  Only a small guerilla contingent of German colonial troops were able to carry on their fight in German East Africa (future Tanzania—see the film, “The Jungle Queen” for a dramatic portrayal).  Britain and its dominions also engaged Germany’s ally, the Ottoman Empire (see “Lawrence of Arabia”) for the duration of the war.

 

 

A Fateful Twenty Years

 

The disintegrating empires in eastern Europe (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Ottoman Turkey) gave rise a slew of new democracies.  But the war also left famine, pestilence (“the flu”), and political turmoil.  Offering humanitarian aid and a nod to the new League of Nations (Woodrow Wilson’s brainchild, rejected by the folks back home), Europe was left to pick up the pieces.

 

Because the United States had not joined the League of Nations, it was not entitled to take control of any of the German colonies being put under trusteeship to allied countries.  In Africa, the four German colonies were divided between Britain and France.  In the Pacific, those south of the equator went to New Zealand (German Samoa), and Australia (German New Guinea and the Solomon Islands).

 

The German territories north of the equator fell to Japan.  Tokyo had decided to enter the war immediately in 1914, with an eye to seizing German territory and enhancing its position in the region.  Thus, they occupied German Micronesia (hemming in the US possessions in Guam and the Philippines), but more importantly for the Japanese imperial project, they took control of Germany’s China interests: the port of Qingdao and the surrounding German “Sphere of Influence”.  Americans didn’t want to be bothered by overseas wars and power plays, but the United States had colonies and strategic possessions.  War would find them soon enough.

 

 

War Again

 

When Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, and full-fledged war gripped Europe again, the Unted States stood by and watched from afar.  France fell, giving Germany access to the French colonies in North Arica (see “Casablanca”).  There is evidence that Franklin Roosevelt wanted to see Britain worn down because, by US military assessments, the British Empire was the only significant threat to the United States—there were even plans for invading Canada should the empire launch a war against its former colonies.  As the Battle of Britain raged, Canada became the lifeline for the UK, supplying food stuffs, weapons, and fuel via convoys departing from Halifax and Sydney, Nova Scotia.  After the ignominious defeat of British troops at Dunkirk, Canada provided the only fully in-tact fighting force on the island of Britain to oppose a possible German invasion.

 

What is often missed in the accounts of those two years (after France had fallen and Britain stood alone) is that the fighting raged not only in Europe.  Japan systematically moved against British, French, and Dutch possessions in southeast Asia.  With France and the Netherlands occupied by Hitler’s forces, their colonies in the region were left to their own devices and could not defend themselves.  Britain and her dominions fought bravely but were stretched thin.  In Hong Kong, a too small Canadian force was subdued and captured.  Malaysia and Singapore fell.  Japan moved against Australian controlled eastern New Guinea and even occupied part of the norther coast of Australia itself.  Japan and its ally Thailand overran British Burma (see, "Bridge on the River Kwai"). Indian and African colonial troops, as well as Chinese forces fought to halt the invasion at the borders of India and China.

 

Other than the Soviet Union, the only major threat to Japanese expansion was the United States.  The high command in Tokyo deemed it essential to knock the United States out of the war before they could enter it.  Thus, was conceived the greatest military miscalculation of the time: the attack on Pearl Harbor, in the US Pacific territory of Hawai’i, with immediate follow-up actions against the Philippines and Guam.  The damage done and the gauntlet thrown down, the United States was forced to declare war on Japan.

 

Next came what was perhaps the second greatest miscalculation of the war: Germany, as an ally of Japan, declared war on the United States.  Germany followed up its declaration by waging submarine warfare against American shipping along the eastern seaboard of the United States.  The damage to American shipping was so great, and the US Navy’s preparedness so poor, that a news blackout was imposed to prevent public panic.  Only after the war would the American public learn of the success of German U-Boots within US territorial waters in those early months of 1942.  Contrary to the narrative that suggests that the United States nobly and selflessly came to Britain’s aid, Franklin Roosevelt, in fact, strung Winston Churchill along for two years with many unfulfilled promises, stalling him and letting the two-theatre war on the British Empire run its course.  However, when the war came to America’s shores, FDR and Congress had to act.

 

Even the dreaded Soviet Union became an ally.  A military road was built across northwestern Canada (the Alaska Highway) to deliver equipment and supplies to Alaska to be shipped on to the USSR.  It was this American aid to the Soviets, and the clandestine assurance from Japan that they would not attack, that gave Stalin what he needed to begin to turn the tide against the German invaders.  [An aside: To this day, Russia will not acknowledge this extensive support from the United States, and one wonders if J.D. Vance will ever demand a public thank you for it from Vladimir Putin.]

 

 

Cementing the Myth into the American Psyche

 

America had come to the rescue a second time!  Or, at least, that’s how the story began to be told.  And certainly, western Europeans were grateful for the presence of American forces, for the situation in Europe was greatly changed.  To defeat Nazi Germany, Roosevelt and Churchill had had to hand over nearly half of the continent to Stalin.  A line was drawn, an iron curtain descended, and the United States leadership decided on a different strategy from the withdrawal they had caried out after World War I.  They funded the reconstruction of Europe to foster a set of close allies who would form a bulwark against Stalin.  An alliance was founded—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—to coordinate the armies of free Europe under US leadership to contain the Soviet Union.  Even the new West Germany was allowed to rearm to provide a force to slow the hypothesized Red Army advance.  Indeed, Germany was seen to be the primary battlefield in a future conflict.

 

The myth of America bailing Europe out was reinforced in various books and films, such as Leonard Wibberly’s 1955 satirical novel “The Mouse That Roared” (made into a film starring Peter Sellers the following year), and the numerous American war films from that time that emphasize the role of the scrappy US G.I. and hide the role of other actors.  The result is skewed mental images.  For example, in the minds of Americans, D-Day is seen as a largely American endeavour.  In fact, three of the five Normandy beaches (60%) were under British and Canadian command.  Indeed, a total of thirteen countries participated in the operation.  At the same time, the French Underground sabotaged rail lines, electrical lines, and communication lines in coordination with the allies to trip up the German response.  It was a truly international endeavour.

 

Similarly, the liberation of western Europe is seen as a largely American undertaking.  In truth, British and Canadian troops pushed back the Germans through northern France, the Low Countries, and into northern Germany.  Free French troops advanced across central France and into southern Germany.  In Italy—which a novel like Joseph Heller’s, “Catch-22,” would have us believe was a largely American affair—145,000 troops from the British Commonwealth (of which 93,000 were Canadians) fought along side them (see Michael Ondaatje’s, “The English Patient”).  It was a coordinated effort of allies, helping each other to achieve a common goal, not the philanthropic gift of one country to a bunch of others.

 

Nevertheless, the end of World War II allowed the United States to create a security and economic system that put itself at the centre.  The US dollar became the global currency.  The United States dominated manufacturing into the 1960’s and dominates international finance to this day.

 

In this bi-polar world where everything outside the Soviet sphere was economically oriented toward the United States, America’s NATO allies in Europe served as the forward defensive wall against the USSR.  But they were also potential customers for US arms manufacturers.  Even as Europe began the long, slow road to economic integration for the sake of lasting peace, successive US administrations discouraged the Europeans from making too many of their own weapon systems.  These were potential customers for US firms, and the White House and Congress were happy to keep them dependent.  Only France did not play along, preferring to pursue an independent defence policy.  The policy makers of the United States and other NATO members found France’s stance laughable.  After all, the US would always be there to back its friends—at least, that was the idea.  If the United Sates had really wanted the Europeans to stand alone, they would have discouraged them from buying US systems and encouraged them to coordinate better with each other to achieve the economies of scale to make more of their own systems.

 

It is also important to point out here that during the Cold War (1945 -1989), the major “bailing out” that the United States engaged in was in Asia, and not in Europe: namely in Korea and Vietnam.  The first baling out after the Cold War was Kuwait from Iraq.  Later would come Kosovo from Serbia, with NATO allies working along side.

 

 

NATO Without the USSR

 

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), the Cold War was over.  It seemed that the west and its liberal democratic capitalism had won.  The “peace dividend” allowed for a scaling back of militaries.  Many European countries converted their large conscript armies into smaller, professional forces.  A slow, unforeseen rotting of capabilities by neglect set in for many NATO member states.  But the newly freed countries of eastern Europe were not so sure that Russia would remain contained.  They wanted admission to the defensive alliance, even as the old-line members wondered what the alliance was for.

 

September 11, 2001, changed the world and security needs again.  George W. Bush declared a “War on Terror” and invoked Article 5 of the NATO charter: “An attack against one is an attack against all.”  It has been the only time so far that this article has ever been invoked.  The United States called on its allies to go after the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for harbouring the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks that killed so many and destroyed so much on American soil.  All the NATO allies answered the call, sending contingents to Afghanistan to push the Taliban out and establish a modern democracy.  NATO militaries rejigged themselves to deal with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.  When, in 2003, the White House called for similar action against Iraq, the response was more muted because such an action seemed unjustified.  There had been no attack on US soil.  The call to invade Iraq seemed rather to have some other, non-NATO related rationale that was not being shared.  Nevertheless, NATO allies UK and Poland (which joined in 1999) sent troops, as did Australia.  Still, other NATO countries continued their involvement in Afghanistan, putting their people at risk, taking losses.  They continued to do so, in honour of their NATO commitments, until the United States, who had invoked Article 5, declared a unilateral withdrawal 2020-2021—one that took its NATO allies by surprise and one that was poorly managed. [Will J.D. Vance give a public thank you in front of the cameras at NATO headquarters?]

 

 

An Empire Grows Tired

 

The long “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq soured the American public on foreign military involvement.  There was a desire to pull back.  When Putin’s Russia began to show its cards in the seizure of Ukrainian territory in Crimea and the Donbas, the Obama administration quietly suggested to its NATO allies that they needed to spend more on defence.  A goal of 2% of GDP was set.  When Donald Trump became president, he pushed harder and threatened those who did not ante-up by saying that the US would not come to their assistance.  While the newer eastern European members of Europe understood all too well what Russia was up to, those in the west still thought that Putin could be a negotiating partner.  It was not until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that the mask was off and Russia’s imperial ambitions became clear—as did Europe’s unpreparedness.  Poor leadership in Europe did not help the situation, nor did a fearful escalation management policy from the White House.

 

The second Trump administration has all but pulled the plug on Europe and Ukraine.  The European Union and NATO (other than the United States) are scrambling to expand their military-industrial base to US levels.  It can all sound like Europe’s “problem of their own making”, especially if one has in mind the myth that American is always baling out Europe.  However, as I have pointed out above, many factors have led to this point.

 

1)        The loss of focus on defence after 1990

2)        The distraction of the War on Terror

3)        The European failure to integrate further in the defence sector coupled with the US drive to sell weapons to Europe, thus keeping Europe’s defence industry balkanised, limiting the types of systems which the Europeans could afford to build for themselves if they had the economies of scale

4)        A failure to appreciate the trajectory and goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime while at the same time being played by him to believe that he is a trustworthy actor (which he is not)

5)        The weak leadership of the Obama White House on the international stage, especially the limp response to Russia’s taking of Crimea and the Donbas coupled with Angela Merkel's belief that she understood Putin (whom she clearly did not)

6)        The timidity of the Biden White House in challenging Russia and the “barely enough” assistance to Ukraine

7)        The impulsive nature of Donald Trump, his desire for quick action coupled with an impatience for systematic thought, all made worse by his inclination to see Putin as a friend

8)        The apparent animus of many in the Trump White House toward Europe, Ukraine, and Canada (also a NATO ally)

 

To boot, the continuous encouragement over decades to buy American arms rather than invest in domestic European production has left Europe hampered in its ability to truly take full control of its own defence needs.  A country like Denmark, for example, which has increased its defence spending significantly, has a military equipped almost exclusively with US made arms, and has virtually no armaments industry of its own.  Sweden and Finland are outliers because they were not part of NATO and had to act on their own.  Germany and the UK have significant arms industries, but focused on certain specialities.  France is the only one of the larger countries to try to maintain a complete arms industry.  US firms have profited handsomely from European arms purchases.  [Will J.D. Vance thank them on behalf of American workers?]

No, America is not always bailing out Europe, but right now, based on the behaviour of this administration it does seem to be about to bail out Russia.